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Peck v. Zipf, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 108 (Dec. 28, 2017)1
TORT LAW: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Summary
Under NRS 41A.071, a plaintiff’s malpractice claim must be dismissed if the claim is not
accompanied by an expert affidavit, but NRS 41A.100(1) states that the expert affidavit need not
be submitted if the medical malpractice claim is argued under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Because the appellant failed to prove that the instrument left in his body was the result of surgery,
the claim was properly dismissed in that the claim did not satisfy the elements to permit the
statutory exception of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Likewise, NRS 41A.071 does not violate the
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses as applied to inmates or indigent people.
Background
Frank Peck, an inmate at High Desert State Prison in Indian Springs, was admitted at Valley
Hospital in December 2013 under the care of Dr. David R. Zipf and Dr. Michael D. Barnum.
Following his release, Peck claimed that he discovered a foreign object under the skin of his left
hand, alleging that the doctors left a needle in his hand. Peck cited NRS 41A.100(1)(a) which states
that expert testimony may not be needed in medical malpractice claims if the alleged harm “is a
matter of common knowledge of laymen”.2 Peck, though, failed to argue that he indeed did have
surgery. Thus, the district court granted summary judgment as Peck did not satisfy the
requirements to invoke NRS 41A.100(1). Because he did not satisfy the requirements to invoke
the res ipsa exception to the medical affidavit requirement and failed to include the medical
affidavit with his malpractice claim, the claim was properly dismissed under NRS 41A.071.
Discussion
On appeal, Peck contends that the expert affidavit was not necessary under NRS
41A.100(1)(a). Furthermore, he argues that NRS 41A.071 is unconstitutional in that it violates his
equal protection and due process rights. Ultimately, the court disagreed with Peck’s contentions
and affirmed the district court’s decision.
Standard of Review
The district court may grant summary judgment “when material facts are not in dispute and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”.3 Thus, this court will accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to nonmoving party. 4
The district court’s dismissal will be reviewed de novo.
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NRS 41A.071’s affidavit requirement applies to Peck’s complaint
NRS 41A.071 requires that a medical malpractice claim be accompanied by an expert
affidavit and if the claim does not include it, the claim shall be rendered invalid. However, the
expert affidavit requirement can be superseded if the claim falls under one of the enumerated res
ipsa loquitur exceptions recognized in NRS 41A.100(1). Peck did not include an expert affidavit
in his claim, and the claim will thus be rendered void unless it falls into one of the exceptions.
NRS 41A.100(1)(a) states that the expert affidavit is unnecessary if a “foreign substance
other than medication or a prosthetic device was unintentionally left within the body of a patient
following surgery”. However, he failed to discuss the medical procedure or allege that the
instrument left in his body occurred as a result of a surgery. NRS 41A.100(1)(a) does not define
surgery. Since the statute did not define surgery, the court considered the plain and ordinary
meaning of a word to reach the conclusion.5 Black's Law Dictionary defines surgery as "that branch
of medical science which treats of mechanical or operative measures for healing diseases,
deformities, disorders, or injuries".6 NAC 449.9743 defines "surgery" as "the treatment of a human
being by operative methods". The court held that the intravenous needle is not an “operative
method”, and Peck’s claim did not satisfy the NRS 41A.100(1)(a) res ipsa loquitur exception.
NRS 41A.100 codified and replaced the common law res ipsa loquitur doctrine
Peck also contended that the expert affidavit is unnecessary under the common law res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. However, the Nevada Legislature codified the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and
determined that an expert affidavit is necessary except for in the instance of one of the enumerated
exceptions of NRS 41A.100(1)(a)-(e). The Nevada codification intended to replace the common
law res ipsa loquitur doctrine rather than merely supplement it.7 The language of the statute is clear
that NRS 41A.100(1)(a)-(e) refer to res ipsa loquitur exceptions in surgery, not other procedures.
Allowing the common law res ipsa loquitur doctrine to supersede the codified NRS 41A.100(1)(a)
would take the bite out of the statute and render it meaningless. The court denied this argument
and affirmed the district court’s use of the statute rather than the common law doctrine.
NRS 41A.071 does not violate equal protection or due process
Peck argued that the expert affidavit requirement is in violation to his equal protection and
due process rights, citing that NRS 41A.071 1) creates an unfair distinction between medical
malpractice plaintiffs and regular negligence plaintiffs, 2) prevents indigent people from having
the opportunity to pursue their claims, and 3) makes it more difficult for inmates to prosecute
medical malpractice claims. Statutes, though, are presumptively valid and a plaintiff who
challenges a statute must shoulder the burden of proof and demonstrate the invalidity.8 When the
law does not implicate either a suspect class or a fundamental right, then the statute need only be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.9
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No unconstitutional distinction exists
The right to pursue medical malpractice claims is not supported as a fundamental right.10
Likewise, Peck failed to argue that a suspect class is implicated because of NRS 41A.071. Since
the law does not implicate either a suspect class or a fundamental right, then the statute need only
survive the rational basis review. NRS 41A.071 aimed to deter frivolous malpractice suits, settling
upon the statute to weigh the right of the plaintiff to litigate harms while incentivizing doctors to
practice here in Nevada by lowering malpractice insurance premiums. Thus, the affidavits were
supported by the legitimate government interest in protecting doctors against the malpractice crisis.
Court access remains reasonably unfettered
Peck cited Barnes v. Eighth Judicial District Court,11 where the district court denied three
indigent plaintiffs their NRS 12.015(1) motion to proceed with litigation without paying attorney
fees because they did not have attorney affidavits to prove the complaints had merit. The statute
specifically prevented indigent people from bringing a claim before the court without an attorney
affidavit to show the case had merit. The current case is distinguishable in that NRS 41A.071
requires all medical malpractice claims to include an expert affidavit, not just the indigent or
inmate populations. Likewise, the right to access the judicial process is available but not unfettered,
and requiring an expert affidavit does not unfairly hinder the indigent. Thus, NRS 41A.071 does
not unreasonably create a suspect class.
Inmates are not unconstitutionally precluded from pursuing medical malpractice claims
Peck also cited Boddie v. Connecticut12 where the Supreme Court determined that the
imposition of court costs upon indigent plaintiffs seeking divorce violated their equal protection
rights. Medical malpractice claims do not carry the same societal importance as marriage.
Furthermore, Peck cited Bounds v. Smith13 because there, the Supreme Court held that inmates
have a constitutional right of access to the courts. That right does not include an unfettered access
to civil lawsuits within the judicial system. Instead, inmates possess a right to resources that will
help them fight their criminal sentences and to challenge the conditions of their imprisonment. 14
Ultimately, prisoners are not a suspect class and there is no fundamental right to medical
malpractice damages. For these reasons, the expert affidavit requirement is rationally-related to a
legitimate government interest and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Conclusion
The court affirmed the district court’s holding and upheld summary judgment on behalf of
Dr. Zipf and Dr. Barnum because Peck failed to include an expert affidavit in his claim, and his
claim was insufficient to constitute the res ipsa loquitur exception to the expert affidavit
requirement.
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